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Abstract Framing effects occur when different descriptions of the same decision
problemgiverisetodivergentdecisions.Theycanbeseenasaviolationofthedecision-
theoretic version of the principle of extensionality (PE). The PE in logic means that
two logically equivalent sentences can be substituted salva veritate. We explore what
this notion of extensionality becomes in decision contexts. Violations of extension-
ality may have rational grounds. Based on some ideas proposed by the psychologist
Craig McKenzie and colleagues, we contend that framing effects are justiﬁed when
the selection of one particular frame conveys choice relevant information. We ﬁrst
discuss this idea from a philosophical point of view, and proceed next to formalize it
ﬁrst in the context of the Bolker–Jeffrey decision theory. Finally, we extend the previ-
ous analysis to non-expected utility theories using the Biseparable Preference model
introduced by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) and therefore show that the analysis
is independent of the assumptions of Bayesian decision theory.
Keywords Framing effects · Extensionality · Information processing ·
Bolker–Jeffrey decision model · Biseparable Preferences
1 Introduction
Framing effects occur when different descriptions of the same decision problem give
rise to divergent decisions. They are a well-documented experimental fact, as shown
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by surveys by Kühberger (1998) and Levin et al. (1998). They cover a great diversity
ofphenomena,relatedtothediversityofexperimentalconditions.1 However,awidely
accepted, though seldom explicitly formulated,2 principle of decision-theoretic mod-
els states that preferences should not be affected by a variation in the description of
the problem (Arrow 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 2000, Chap. 12). This principle is
very often referred to as the invariance principle. Arrow calls it extensionality, which
is an explicit reference to a principle of logic. In logic, the principle of extensionality
requiresoftwoformulaswhichhavethesametruth-valueunderanytruth-assignments
to be mutually substitutable salva veritate in a sentence that contains one of these for-
mulas.Itcanthusbeunderstoodastheapplicationoftheinvarianceprincipletological
contexts wherein truth-preservation is what is essentially at stake, but one can also
envision invariance at a higher level of generality, encompassing decision-theoretic
contexts. In the latter case, it is not only truth, but more generally information relevant
to the coherent application of principles of choice among various alternatives, which
is considered. The invariance principle then sets up a constraint on what must count
as equivalent pieces or states of information from the point of view of the exercice of
rational choice. Sen (1986, Chap. 2) spells out this notion of invariance as exerting an
informational constraint on what objects of choice count as equivalent by introducing
the idea of an isoinformation set containing objects of choice taken to be similar in
terms of relevant information and which will be consequently treated in the same way
in actual choices and judgements. Of course, one can easily remark that the notion
of what is informationally relevant is crucial here. It will determine what objects
belong to the same isoinformation set. It is precisely inherent to an invariance prin-
ciple to specify under what dimension or characterization objects will be taken to be
isoinformative. Once this notion of informational relevance and invariance is ﬁxed in
the particular case of decision contexts, violations of extensionality in those contexts
mean that irrelevant information appears to determine the choices or judgments that
arebeingmade.Framingeffectscanthenbedeﬁnedascasesinwhichobjectsarebeing
discriminated and treated in a way that is not in accordance with the informational
constraint embodied by the invariance principle normally usually assumed to prevail
in the contexts at hand.
Different interpretations have been proposed for framing effects under their var-
ious guises, mainly from a purely psychological point of view. Because they have
long been discarded as irrational and because formal models of decision theory have
for a long time only cared about rational behavior, there are very few formal mod-
els of framing effects. Obviously the introduction of framing effects into formal
models entails a recasting of classical decision-theoretic models. In the most fa-
mous of these formal models, Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979,
1 Levin et al. (1998) thus distinguish three kinds of framing effects, based on what is manipulated:
– risky choice framing: manipulation of the consequences of risky prospects,
– attribute framing: manipulation of one attribute of the objects to be evaluated,
– goal framing: manipulation of the goal of a given action or behavior.
2 SeeCohenandJaffray(1980),Lipman(1999),Rubinstein(2000),andLeMenestrelandVanWassenhove






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
Tversky and Kahneman 1992), framing effects motivate the introduction of reference
dependence and of different behaviors in the domains of gains and losses—specifi-
cally, risk aversion in the domain of gains and risk propensity in the domain of losses.
In this account of framing effects, different frames lead to the selection of different
reference points, hence to a different encoding of outcomes as gains or losses and
therefore to different choices.
Until recently, this model remained the only one for framing effects. Some alter-
native models currently emerge. Gold and List (2004) base their account of framing
effects on a decision-making process in which decisions are the result of the accep-
tanceorrejectionofasetofbackground propositions,whichconstitutethereasonsfor
decision. Giraud (2004) develops an axiomatic model of framing effects and shows
that they occur because the decision maker perceives some missing information in
the decision problem and different frames lead him to attribute different probabili-
ties to the implicit states of the world corresponding to the missing information. A
similar idea can be found in Ahn and Ergin (2007) where the contingencies can be
framed in different ways in the sense that some events may or may not be distin-
guished, i.e., foreseen by the decision maker, and not foreseeing some events makes
a difference.
In this article, we pursue this line of explanation and rationalization of framing
effects in the context of two well-established decision models: the Bolker–Jeffrey
(proposition-based) decision model, which is a Bayesian model, and the Bisepa-
rable Preference decision model of Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001), which is a
non-BayesianandverygeneralmodelaccommodatingtheEllsbergparadox.Byinves-
tigating the source of extensionality in the Bolker–Jeffrey model, we will see why it
cannotsimplyaccommodateframingeffects.Aswewillshow,Bolker–Jeffreydecision
theoryimplicitlyreliesontheentailmentofindifferencefromlogicalequivalence.Our
bypassing strategy will then be to formalize in the original Bolker–Jeffrey framework
theideathattwopropositionsrefertothesamestateoftheworld,anotionweshallcall
coreportiveness.Wewillthenshowhowthisallows,ﬁrst,thatcoreportivepropositions
may not belong to the same isoinformation set (in the sense of Sen 1986) and how
this implies violations of extensionality. We will then proceed to extend the approach
followed in the context of the Bolker–Jeffrey model to the Ghirardato–Marinacci
model, in order to show that this approach is perfectly compatible with accommodat-
ing the Ellsberg paradox.
2 Extensionality in the Bolker–Jeffrey model
In this section, we shall ﬁrst review the basic features of the Bolker and Jeffrey deci-
sion model and then single out what is arguably the true source of extensionality in
the model.
2.1 The Bolker–Jeffrey decision model
The most distinctive feature of Bolker and Jeffrey’s decision model is that in this






































9S. Bourgeois-Gironde, R. Giraud
they bear on non-null elements of a complete and atomfree Boolean algebra,3 that
are interpreted as propositions. Recall the following definitions: a Boolean algebra
is a tuple  A ,∧,∨,¬, ,⊥  where A is a nonempty set, ∧, ∨ two commutative,
associative, and distributive with respect to each other binary operations, ¬ a unary
operation, and   and ⊥ two elements of A satisfying4
(i) a ∨ (a ∧ b) = a and a ∧ (a ∨ b) = a;
(ii) a ∧¬ a =⊥and a ∨¬ a =  .
ThecanonicalexampleofaBooleanalgebraistheset2X ofallsubsetsofagivenset X
togetherwiththenaturalsetoperationsofunion,intersection,andcomplementation.A
Boolean algebra is complete if the binary operations can be performed on an arbitrary
familyofelements(i.e.,if(ai)i∈I isafamilyofelementsofA ,then

i∈I ai ∈ A and 
i∈I ai ∈ A ). A Boolean algebra is naturally endowed with a partial order deﬁned
by a ≤ b if and only if a ∨ b = b.I ti satomfree if for any a ∈ A , there exists a ,a  
such that a ,a   ≤ a, a ,a    = a and a = a  ∨ a  . Note that the interpretation of
elements of a Boolean algebra as propositions requires some manipulation on which
we shall come back later on, since extensionality heavily relies on this identiﬁcation.
Let  A ,∧,∨,¬, ,⊥  be the Boolean algebra of interest and A   := A   {⊥}.
We consider a binary relation  deﬁned on A   representing preferences. Let a and
b be two elements of A . The phrase “a  b” must be understood as expressing the
fact that the decision maker prefers that the proposition a to be true rather than the
proposition b. Therefore, this statement of preference may be understood as saying
that the decision maker prefers the world to be in a certain state described by a to its
being in the state described by b.
This preference relation is assumed to satisfy the following axioms.
BJ 1  is complete and transitive.
Two elements a,b are disjoint if a ∧ b =⊥ .
BJ 2 For all disjoint a,b ∈ A  , a   b ⇒ a   a ∨ b   b and a ∼ b ⇒ a ∼
a ∨ b ∼ b.
BJ 3 For all pairwise disjoint a,b,c ∈ A  ,i fa ∼ b  ∼ c and a ∨ c ∼ b ∨ c then, for
all d disjoint from a and b, a ∨ d ∼ b ∨ d.





an), if b   a   c, then there exists N ∈ N such that b   an   c for all n ≥ N.
We now give the version of Bolker’s theorem that will be of use in the sequel of
this article.
Theorem 1 Under axioms BJ 1 to BJ 4, there exist a function U : A   → R and a
probability measure P : A   →[ 0,1] such that, for all a,b ∈ A  
3 An example of a complete atomfree Boolean algebra is the set of subsets of R that are equal to the closure
of their interior.






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
1. U(a) ≥ U(b) ⇐⇒ a  b;





which shall be of further use in the sequel.
2.2 Why are violations of extensionality precluded in the Bolker–Jeffrey model
When reviewing the basic features of the Bolker–Jeffrey model, we alluded to the
fact that the interpretation of elements of a Boolean algebra as propositions was not
completely straightforward, and that it was related to extensionality. We shall now
make this point clearer. Let F denote the set of formulas of a classical propositional
language. The conjunction and disjunction operators, ∧ and ∨, and the negation oper-
ator ¬, together with their classical properties, are natural candidates to make of F
a Boolean algebra. However, in classical logic, all the properties of Boolean alge-
bras are satisﬁed with the restriction that all equality signs in their statement must
be replaced by the bi-conditional ↔. Therefore, strictly speaking F is not a Boolean
algebra. However, it is very close to be one. Let us see how the connection is made.
Let T, the set of classical truth functions, be the set of functions t : F →{ 0,1} satis-
fying t(α ∧ β) = min{t(α),t(β)} and t(¬α) = 1 − t(α). We say that α is logically
equivalent to β, denoted α ≡ β whenever t(α) = t(β) for all t ∈ T. This deﬁnes an
equivalence relation. Let a =[ α] be the equivalence class of α (and b the equivalence
class of β). a is the proposition expressed by sentence α.L e tP := F/≡ be the set of
propositions. Deﬁning
a ∧ b := [α ∧ β], a ∨ b := [α ∨ β], ⊥: =[ ⊥ ] ,  : =[   ] and ¬a := [¬α]
makes P into a Boolean algebra, the Boolean algebra of classical logic. Assuming
the appropriate additional properties for F and T, one would easily ensure that this
Boolean algebra be complete and atomfree.
Thisconstructionshowsthat,ifoneidentiﬁesaformulaandanelementofaBoolean
algebra, one is in fact implicitly neglecting any morphological differences between




Another way of understanding this is to view extensionality as an implicit axiom
of the theory: let us consider a preference relation F on F. In order to be able to
apply Bolker’s theorem to derive utilities and probabilities on sentences, one must
ﬁrst transfer the preference relation from F to P to construct them on propositions.A
natural way of doing this is to deﬁne






































9S. Bourgeois-Gironde, R. Giraud
but this relation is ill-deﬁned on P unless one assumes the following consistency
requirement:5
∀a,b ∈ F, a ≡ b ⇒ a ∼F b.
This axiom is exactly the extensionality principle and, as coreportive sentences are
logically equivalent, it precludes framing effects. Therefore, violations of extension-
ality are precluded in the Bolker–Jeffrey logic of decision. Is there, however, a way of
bypassing this result?
3 Bypassing extensionality in the Bolker–Jeffrey decision model
3.1 The main idea
As we have just seen, extensionality in the Bolker–Jeffrey decision model is forced
onto us by an implicit axiom implied both by the mathematical structure of the set on
which preferences are deﬁned, and by the interpretation of this set as a set of prop-
ositions. In order to bypass extensionality, therefore, it is desirable to modify either
this structure or its interpretation in an appropriate way. By appropriate, we mean
essentially that this modiﬁcation should meet the following requirements:
1. Preserve the interpretation of objects of choice as propositions;
2. Preserve the mathematical tractability (i.e., applicability of Bolker’s theorem);
3. Allow for a formal definition of extensionality in the model.
The ﬁrst two requirements amount essentially to the preservation of the Boolean
structure, and we shall see in the formal development how this is easily done. Some
words of comment on the third requirement are, however, in order. If one wants to
be able to bypass extensionality, one must ﬁrst make this axiom explicit. However,
if one deﬁnes extensionality of preferences in the same spirit as logical extensional-
ity, imposing indifference for logically equivalent sentences, this is impossible in the
Bolker–Jeffrey setup, as logically equivalent sentences are collapsed into a single
object: the proposition they express. It is possible, however, to use another property of
the logically equivalent sentences involved in framing effects: the fact that they refer
to the same event.
3.2 The formal model
Weshallconsidertwosets,E andP,thatweassume,likeintheBolker–Jeffreydecision
model, to be atomfree and complete Boolean algebras. Elements of E are the possible
events of interest in a given decision problem. Elements of P are to be interpreted as
5 The situations here bear some resemblance to the unearthing of the implicit independence condition in
von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axiomatization of Expected Utility. They worked directly on utilities,
and deﬁned mixtures of utilities. For this definition to be well deﬁned, an implicit consistency axiom was






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
propositions describing a given event, which in turn is an element of E. To make this
connection formal, we shall deﬁne a frame as a Boolean homomorphism from E to P.
Recall that a homomorphism between two Boolean algebras A and B, is a mapping
ϕ : A → B such that:
ϕ(a ∧ a ) = ϕ(a) ∧ ϕ(a ) and ϕ(¬a) =¬ ϕ(a).
It follows from this definition that
ϕ(a ∨ a ) = ϕ(a) ∨ ϕ(a ), ϕ(⊥) =⊥ and ϕ( ) =  .
We deﬁne a decision problem with framing as a tuple  E,P, , , where  ,t h es e t
offrames,isanonemptysetofhomomorphismsfromE toPandisabinaryrelation
deﬁned over the set P  = P {⊥} of noncontradictory propositions.
Let us now illustrate how the formalism ﬁts the intuition of framing effects, and
more precisely how a frame and a proposition are conceptually different. Consider
ﬁrst, the familiar example of the half-empty/hall-full glass. The event corresponding
to this glass could be identiﬁed with the quantity of water the glass contains and the
quantity it can contain. This is e. Now this event can be described according to two
differentframes:apositiveframe,ϕ+,accordingtowhichitishalf-full,andanegative
frame, ϕ−, according to which it is half-empty. Consider now the proposition “The
glass is half-full” (s+). This proposition can be interpreted as being ϕ+(e), i.e., the
event e described in the positive frame. Conversely, the proposition s−: “ the glass is
half-empty” can be viewed as ϕ−(e). We can now consider the same glass with half
as much water, event e .N o wϕ+(e ) is “the glass is one quarter-full” and ϕ−(e ) is
“the glass is three quarters-empty”.
Let us take another example that is more clearly related to a decision problem. This
is an example by Quattrone and Tversky (2000, Chap. 25). Consider economic poli-
ciescharacterizedbyemployment,unemployment,andinﬂationrates.PolicyAyields
90% of employment and 12% of inﬂation. Policy B yields 95% of employment and
17% of inﬂation. Policy C yields 10% of unemployment and 12% of inﬂation. Policy
Dyields5%ofunemployment and17%ofinﬂation.Theproblemistochoosethebest
policy. Clearly, policies A and C can be seen as describing the same event. However,
they describe it using different frames, the employment frame and the unemployment
frame. The same can be said of B and D.
The principle of extensionality can be expressed in this framework:
Extensionality Principle ThepreferencerelationsatisﬁestheExtensionalityPrin-
ciple if, for all e,e  ∈ E, for all ϕ,ϕ ,ψ,ψ  ∈  , then
ϕ(e)  ϕ (e ) ⇐⇒ ψ(e)  ψ (e ).
For any p ∈ P, if there exist a frame ϕ and an event e such that p = ϕ(e), then e
will be said to be the reference of proposition p relative to frame ϕ. We call coreport-






































9S. Bourgeois-Gironde, R. Giraud
implies that substituting coreportive propositions one for the other does not modify
the preference ordering.
In order to state the result that shows that extensionality has been bypassed, we
need to introduce the following concept:
Deﬁnition 1 Let e be an event. An event k is a good news for e if:
(i) ϕ(e ∧ k) ∼ ϕ (e ∧ k), for all ϕ,ϕ  ∈  ;
(ii) ϕ(e ∧¬ k) ∼ ϕ (e ∧¬ k), for all ϕ,ϕ  ∈  ;
(iii) ϕ(e ∧ k)   ϕ(e ∧¬ k) for all ϕ ∈  .
Intuitively, a good news for a given decision is an information that we would rather
have prior to making the decision and that helps us make the right decision. Now,
from the formal definition of the concept of good news, it is clear that prior to decid-
ing whether he/she should go for decision e (i.e., decide that e be the true event),
the decision maker would like to know if k obtains or does not obtain, because, if
he/she knew it, he/she would know if he/she would be better off by choosing e or by
refraining from doing so: he/she is better off when choosing e if and only if k obtains,
irrespective of the frame (property (iii)). Moreover, this is a piece of information that
really concerns e because in fact the utility that the decision maker will experience
in the case that he/she has chosen e and that k obtains (respectively, does not obtain)
shallbethesameirrespectiveoftheframe(properties(i)and(ii)).Therefore,knowing
whetherk istrueisreallyknowingsomethingaboutrealconsequencesofthedecision.
In some sense, k forms the basis for an argument in favor of or against the choice of
e:i fk is true, then one should go for e;i fk is not true, then one should refrain from
doing so.
The psychologists Sher and McKenzie (2006) have recently defended a view of
framingeffectsaccordingtowhich,eventhoughsubjectsareawareofthecoreportive-
ness of two propositions, A and B, these propositions may not convey the same infor-
mationforthesubjectsassoonasthespeakerhaschosenoneformulationinsteadofthe
other, as these formulations may license different inferences. In Sher and McKenzie’s
terms: “ Suppose (...) that speaker’s conversational behavior exhibits the following
regularity: speakers, choosing between uttering ‘A’ and uttering ‘B’, are more likely
to utter ‘A’ when some background condition C (not explicitly speciﬁed in the state-
ments A and B) holds than when C fails. In that case, a listener who hears a speaker
say ‘A’ can safely infer a higher probability of C being true than if the speaker had
said ‘B’ (that is, p(C | speaker says ‘A’)>p(C | speaker says ‘B’). If knowledge
about the background condition C is relevant to the choice at hand, then the speaker’s
(e.g., experimenter’s) utterance of the two logically equivalent statements A and B
may with impunity lead to different decisions” (Sher and McKenzie 2006). Sher and
McKenzie’s idea is that different frames provide different clues to the relevant infor-
mation. In other words, if two propositions are not indifferent, it is because the frames
in which their common reference is described do not convey the same probabilistic
information about the relevant pieces of information.
Inparticular,SherandMcKenzie(2006)haveexperimentallydemonstratedthefol-
lowing conversational regularity: speakers usually choose the frame that emphasizes






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
instance, when asked to describe an R&D team in terms of its number of successes or
ofitsnumberoffailures,subjectstendedtodescribeoutstandinglygoodteamsinterms
of their number of successes while they tended to describe outstandingly bad teams in
terms of their number of failures, even when the number of failures and successes was
the same for each team (for instance, 20 failures and 30 successes). Now it is quite
clear that, for somebody who has to make a funding decision for the R&D team in
question,knowing whetheritisagoodorabadteamisrelevant.Letuscallk theevent
that the team is good. In our context, therefore, if the decision to be made is to fund
(e) or not to fund (¬e), then the decision maker is better off if he/she chooses to fund
while the team is good (e ∧ k) than if he/she chooses to fund while the team is bad
(e∧¬k), and this welfare ordering is independent of the way the team was described.
For completeness, let us mention what would be the propositions at stake. There are
two frames here: success (ϕ+) and failure (ϕ−). ϕ+(e) corresponds to the proposition
“funding a team that has had 30 successes”, while ϕ−(¬e) corresponds to “not fund-
ing a team that has had 20 failures”. Given the conversational regularities empirically
observed, both correspond to good decisions. Finally, ϕ−(e ∧¬ k) corresponds to the
proposition “funding a team that is not good and that has had 20 failures”. k is indeed
an example of a good news.
As another example, consider again policies C and D in the macroeconomic policy
example. Based on the conversational regularity recalled above, it could be inferred
from the fact that the policy is described in terms of employment that the correspond-
ing level of inﬂation is usually associated with a lower level of employment. On the
contrary, framing this policy in terms of unemployment suggests this level of inﬂation
usually leads to a lower rate of unemployment.6 Now, knowing which one of these
statements is true is relevant for the decision at hand. Formally, let k be the event “a
12% rate of inﬂation usually corresponds to a rate of employment less than 90% and a
rate of unemployment greater than 10%”. Let e be the event described by both A and
C. Clearly, e ∧ k is preferred to e ∧¬ k. Therefore, k can be considered to be good
news for e.
Let K (e) be the set of good news for e. The following theorem holds (proof in the
Appendix).
Theorem 2 Let the structural assumption hold. Then, if  satisﬁes axioms BJ1 to
BJ4, for each ϕ ∈  , there exists a (ﬁnitely additive) probability measure Pϕ on E
such that, for all ϕ,ϕ  ∈  , for all e ∈ E, for all k ∈ K (e),
ϕ(e)  ϕ (e) ⇔ Pϕ(k | e) ≥ Pϕ (k | e).
As it is easy to see, this theorem offers a way of bypassing extensionality. It gives
indeed the conditions under which the decision maker is indifferent between two
6 One may wonder why it is not possible to infer that this level of unemployment usually corresponds to a
lower level of inﬂation. Both interpretations would agree in the sense that they both indicate that the policy
presentedcorrespondstoabadunemployment/inﬂationtrade-offwithrespecttotheusualsituation.Theidea
isthatthereisnoﬂexibilityforframingthelevelofinﬂationinapositiveoranegativeframeinthisexample,







































9S. Bourgeois-Gironde, R. Giraud
coreportive propositions. These conditions, which need not hold, are exactly the ones
suggested by Sher and McKenzie in their defense of the normative status of framing
effects: they are indifferent if and only if the frames in which their common refer-
ence is expressed convey exactly the same information about choice-relevant pieces
of information: here good news about their reference.
Let us come back to the macroeconomic example to illustrate. As we said, it can be
inferred from the speaker’s choice of A that k is more likely than not ¬k. Similarly, it
can be inferred from the speaker’s choice of C that ¬k is more likely than k.L e teAC
be their common event and ϕe and ϕu be the employment and unemployment frames.
Then A = ϕe(eAC) and C = ϕu(eAC). We therefore have that Pϕe(k | eAC)>1
2 and
Pϕu(k | eAC)<1
2, therefore Pϕe(k | eAC)>Pϕu(k | eAC), yielding A   C.
In the glass example, we can assume that the decision relevant information is
whether the glass was originally empty. Here, the conversational regularity observed
by Sher and McKenzie is that if a speaker describes the glass as half-full, that means
that it was originally empty. Let k be the event: “the glass was originally empty”. This
regularity can thus be written, with the notations of the example, Pϕ+(k | e)>1
2, and
it also implies Pϕ−(k | e)<1
2 (the speaker would not say that the glass is half-full if it
was previously full), and this implies that a half-full glass is preferred to a half-empty
one.
It must be noticed, however, that, to the best of our knowledge, direct comparisons
of the same event framed in different ways have not been tested, although, as it can
be seen, predictions could be made on this comparison based on the insights captured
by Theorem 2. This is especially interesting if one wants to compare it with Prospect
Theory.ProspectTheorymakespredictionsforbehaviorwithinagivenframe,thegain
frame or the loss frame. It does not make any prediction across frames. In that sense,
both Prospect Theory and the theory described above are partial theories of framing
effects and they cannot be directly tested one against the other. So in principle, we
would need a combination of both to account for framing under risk.
We would like, ﬁnally, to relate the model we have proposed to two other models
of framing effects that we have mentioned in the introduction. According to Gold and
List (2004), framing effects arise when two conditions are met: a logical one—that
the order of consideration of the background propositions matters for the decision—,
and an empirical one—that different frames lead to different orders of consideration.
The authors show that the logical condition is equivalent to the existence of (implicit)
inconsistencies in the decision maker’s disposition to accept propositions, i.e., by the
fact that there are contradictions in the set of background propositions the decision
maker is ready to accept. The account we ﬂeshed out can be summarized along sim-
ilar lines: the empirical condition is that the weight of the arguments for or against a
particulardecision,asembodiedbytheprobabilityofthetruthofsomefavorableback-
ground condition, depends on the frame, and the logical condition, spelled out in the
theorem, is that the outcome of the decision process depends on this probability. Fol-
lowing Tversky et al. (2000, Chap. 34) and Gold and List (2004) contrast value-based
accounts of decision making, whereby decision is understood as the maximization of
some function, and reason-based accounts, whereby it is the result of the weighing of






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
based ones. Our formal model tends to show, in our opinion, that the difference is not
so clear as it may seem, as formal, value-based models can be given an interpretation
in terms of arguments. The account of framing effects in Giraud (2004) is based on
the idea that agents perceived that there is some missing information in the decision
problem, that the probability of this missing information depends on the frame, and
that the outcome of the decision process depends on that probability. It is very close
in spirit to the one we have given here, but the formalization is different, as it is based
on a classical set up of decision under risk where objects of choice are lotteries. One
major conceptual difference is that in this article the nature of the missing information
is left implicit, whereas here we ﬂesh it out in a rather precise way.
4 Bypassing extensionality when ambiguity matters
A substantial literature, both empirical and theoretical, now demonstrates and for-
mally studies the impact of ambiguity in decision making under uncertainty, where by
ambiguity it is understood the impossibility of assigning well-deﬁned probabilities to
at least one event, as opposed to the situation of risk (see Gilboa 2004 for references).
Themostappropriatemodelonwhichwecanbaseanextensionoftheresultsabove to
a context where ambiguity matters is the biseparable preference model of Ghirardato
and Marinacci (2001), because it is the weakest model allowing for a clear-cut sep-
aration between beliefs and preferences in the representation. Before describing this
model, let us lay down the formal framework. Let (S, ) be a measurable set of states
of nature and X be a set of outcomes. We assume that X is a connected and separable
topologicalspace.LetF bethesetofsimpleSavageanacts(oracts,forshort),i.e.,the
set of functions f : S → X such that f (S) is ﬁnite and for all x ∈ X, f −1(x) ∈  .
Let  be a preference relation on F.Abet is an act, f , such that there exist two
outcomes x   y and A ∈   such that f (A) ={ x} and f (Ac) ={ y}. We denote xAy
for such an act.
Let  be a preference relation on F. An event A is said to be essential (resp.,
null, universal)f o r if for some bet xAy,w eh a v ex   xAy  y (resp., xAy∼ y,
xAy∼ x). The preference relation  is said to be biseparable if there exists a func-
tion V : F → R, monotonic (i.e., f (s)  g(s) for all s implies V( f )  V(g)) and
unique up to increasing afﬁne transformations whenever  has an essential event, and
a capacity7 ρV :   →[ 0,1] such that
f  g ⇐⇒ V( f ) ≥ V(g); (1)
V(xAy) = ρV(A)uV(x) + (1 − ρV(A))uV(y) for all bets xAy, (2)
where uV(x) := V(x). Ghirardato and Marinacci have shown that if V   is another
such representation, then uV and uV  are afﬁnely related and ρV = ρV .W en e x t
recall the axiomatization of biseparable preferences by Ghirardato and Marinacci.
They introduce the following axioms.
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GM 1  is complete and transitive, and there exist f,g ∈ F such that f   g and an
essential event E.
GM 2 (Dominance) For all f,g ∈ F, f (s)  g(s) for all s implies f  g.
GM 3 (Eventwise monotonicity) For every nonnull A and every x, y  z ∈ X,
x   y  ⇒ xAz  yAz.
For every nonuniversal A and every x, y  z ∈ X,
x   y  ⇒ zAx   zAy.
GM 4 (Subcontinuity)L e t( fα)α∈D be a net and f ∈ F such that fα and f are all
measurable with respect to the same ﬁnite partition, and fα(s) converges to f (s) for
all s ∈ S. Then, for all g ∈ F, fα  g (resp. g  fα) implies f  g (resp. g  f ).
The last axiom uses a definition of subjective mixtures for acts that is as follows.
The previous axiom and the connectedness of X implythat any act f admits a(unique
up to indifference) certainty equivalent c f .L e t f,g ∈ F and A ∈  . Deﬁne the
statewise A-mixture of f and gm A( f,g) by
mA( f,g)(s) = c f (s)Ag(s), for all s ∈ S.
Recall that two acts f,g ∈ F are comotonic if f (s)   f (s ) implies g(s)  g(s )
for all s,s  ∈ S.
GM 5 (Binary Comonotonic Act Independence) For every essential A ∈  ,e v e r y
B ∈  , and for all f,g,h ∈ F such that f = xAy, g = x Ay  and h = x  Ay  ,i f
f,g,h are pairwise comonotonic, and x,x   x   and y, y   y   (or x,x   x   and
y, y   y  ), then
f  g ⇐⇒ mB( f,h)  mB(g,h).
Thefollowingtheoremthenholds,wherearepresentation V issaidtobesubcontin-
uousif,whenever( fα)α∈D isanetand f ∈ F issuchthat fα and f areallmeasurable
with respect to the same ﬁnite partition, and fα(s) converges to f (s) for all s ∈ S,
then V( fα) → V( f ).
Theorem 3 (Ghirardato and Marinacci 2001) The following statements are equiva-
lent:
(i)  satisﬁes axioms GM 1 through GM 5.
(ii) There exist a subcontinuous nontrivial monotonic representation V : F → R
of  and a capacity ρ :   →[ 0,1] such that ρ(E) ∈ (0,1) and for all f ∈ F,
all x  yi nX,a l lA∈  , letting u(x) := V(x) for all x ∈ X,






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
Moreover, the representation V is unique up to positive afﬁne transformations and the
capacity ρ is unique.
We now introduce the framework needed to deal with framing effects. Assume that
there is a set A of actions among which the decision maker has to choose, but that
he/she can process only if they are framed as acts. This makes sense if we think that in
order to make a decision one has to envision different scenarios and the consequences
that may follow from choosing a given action in this or that scenario. Now there might
bedifferentwaysofdescribingthedifferentrelevantscenariosorconsequences,sowe
assumethattherearemanywaysofframinganactionasanact.Weshallthereforecall
frame am a pϕ : A → F and we will consider that the set of available descriptions
is a set   of such functions.
Since we hypothesize that the choice of frames carries information relevant to the
decisionathand,andgrantedthatinthecontextofuncertaintyinformationboilsdown
to knowing whether an event will occur or not, we will model decision making condi-
tional on the knowledge of a given event K. We shall consider that, conditional on K,
the decision maker makes his/her decision on the basis of states that belong to K, and
ignores states that are outside of K.L e t K be the σ-algebra induced by   on K (i.e.,
B ∈  K if B = A∩K forsome A ∈  )andletFK bethesetofactsdeﬁnedon K (i.e.,
simple measurable functions from (K,  K) to X). We shall consider a binary relation
 on F and shall denote by  ∗ the set of events that are nonnull with respect to .
For each K ∈  ∗, we shall consider a binary relation K representing the decision
maker’s preferences on FK, and therefore modeling his/her decision when knowing
that K is the case. To simplify notations, for all f,g ∈ F, when no confusion may
arise, we will write f K g for f|K K g|K, f|K being the restriction of f to K.
We assume the following:
Axiom 1 (Biseparable Preferences—BP)
(i)  satisﬁes axioms GM 1–GM 5.
(ii) For all K ∈  ∗, K satisﬁes axioms GM 1 and GM 4.
Axiom 2 (Outcome Information Independence—OII) For all x, y ∈ X, for all K ∈
 ∗, x K y if and only if x  y.
This axiom essentially says that for constant acts information does not matter.
We will now deﬁne, in the spirit of the previous section, the notion of good news.
The definition process will require several steps for the sake of clarity. Given f ∈ F,
weﬁrstdeﬁnetheconceptofgoodnewsfor f .GivenK ∈  ,write Kc thecomplement
of K.
Deﬁnition 2 Let f ∈ F and K ∈  ∗. K is good news for f if Kc ∈  ∗ and there
exists (x, y) ∈ X2, call the support of K, such that:
(i) f ∼K x,
(ii) f ∼Kc y,
(iii) x   f   y,
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In other words, K is good news for f if the decision maker is better off learning K
while having chosen f than learning Kc while having chosen f . Notice in particular
that, because of condition (iii), G(x) = ∅ for x ∈ X, so this basically means that
there is nothing to be learned about constant acts.
Now, given a ∈ A , a can be expressed by different acts. An event K will be said
to be good news for a if it is informative, with the same support, for all the acts by
which a can be expressed.
Deﬁnition 3 Let a ∈ A and K ∈  ∗. K is good news for a if,
(i) K ∈ G(ϕ(a)), for all ϕ ∈  ,
(ii) ϕ(a) ∼K ψ(a), for all ϕ,ψ ∈  ,
(iii) ϕ(a) ∼Kc ψ(a), for all ϕ,ψ ∈  .
We denote K (a) the set of good news for a.
Although a theorem in the spirit of the previous section could be proved with the
elements already provided, one may wish to impose some structure on the result to be
obtained. We consider therefore the following two additional axioms.
Axiom 3 (Non-Atomicity-NA) For all x, y,z ∈ X, x   z   y implies that there exists
A ∈   such that z ∼ xAy.
ThisaxiomisthecounterpartinoursettingoftheconditionthattheBooleanalgebra
in Bolker–Jeffrey’s setting be atomfree.
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity—MON)Ifforall f ∈ F,forall K, K  ∈ G( f ),withsupport
(x, y) and (x , y ), respectively, such that K ⊆ K , then for all A ∈  ,
x Ay   f  ⇒ xAy f.
According to the definition of a good news event, knowing that this event is or is
not the case allows to identify the act to one of the outcomes of the support of the
event, namely, the good one x or the bad one y. The information that the good news is
true is all the more valuable because of the larger utility difference between x and y.
This axiom thus amounts to imposing that knowing smaller good news events is more
valuable than knowing larger ones.
Theorem 4 BP and OII hold if and only if there exist a function V : F → R,f o r
each K ∈  ∗, a function VK : FK → R and for each f ∈ F a set function
v(·| f ) : G( f ) →[ 0,1] such that,
(i) V is biseparable with willingness to pay ρ and represents ;
(ii) VK represents K, with VK(x) = V(x) for all x ∈ X;
(iii) for all f ∈ F and K ∈ G( f ),
V( f ) = VK( f|K)v(K | f ) + VKc( f|Kc)(1 − v(K | f )).






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
(i) For all α ∈[ 0,1], there exists A ∈   such that ρ(A) = α;
(ii)v ( ·| f ) is monotonic.
This theorem shows that invariant biseparable preferences can be written in a form
that closely resembles the expected utility-type formula that is characteristic of the
Bolker–Jeffreytheorem.Itshouldbenoted,however, that,whileintheBolker–Jeffrey
framework this formula is always true, for biseparable preferences it is true only on
the condition of introducing conditional preferences and only with a certain kind of
events. Thereasonforthisfactisthatthelanguage oftheBolker–Jeffreyframeworkis
poorer than the standard Savage framework in terms of the number of acts it may con-
tain (it can be argued, indeed, that the Bolker–Jeffrey framework reduces to a Savage
framework with only two outcomes).
Now, having retrieved this expected utility form àl aBolker–Jeffrey, it is easy to
prove as a corollary, a version in a context of ambiguity of Theorem 2, that shows that
framingeffectsessentiallyoccurbecausedifferentframessuggestdifferentlikelihoods
for good news.
Corollary 1 If axioms BP and OII hold, then for all a ∈ A and all ϕ ∈  , for all
ϕ,ψ ∈  , for all K ∈ K (a),
ϕ(a)  ψ(a) ⇐⇒ vϕ(K | a) ≥ vψ(K | a),
where vϕ(·|a) : K (a) →[ 0,1] is deﬁned by
vϕ(K | a) = v(K | ϕ(a)).
Moreover, vϕ(·|a) is monotonic if NA and MON hold.
This corollary shows that Sher and McKenzie’s information-based explanation of
framingeffectsdoesnotrelyonanykindofimplicitBayesianism(asindeedsuggested
bytheirexperimentsthatdonotrelyonprobabilities).Allitrequires,atleastaccording
to this result, is that beliefs be separable from preferences in a well-deﬁned manner.
5 Concluding Remarks
Framing effects, i.e., the fact that coreportive sentences are not treated identically in
decision-theoretic contexts,8 are usually understood as demonstrating that subjects
violate one of the most basic axioms of decision theory, namely, extensionality. What
this axiom really is, how it is to be understood, in what sense framing effects violate
it, and to what extent this violation is to be viewed as irrational are questions that
have not, in our opinion, been thoroughly addressed in the literature. In this article,
we have attempted to contribute to this discussion in the framework of the Bolker–
Jeffrey decision model and of the Biseparable Preferences model of Ghirardato and
Marinacci.
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As we have shown, in the standard Bolker–Jeffrey decision model, extensionality
followsbasicallyfromanimplicitstructuralassumptionembeddedintheinterpretation
of the objects on which preferences are expressed in this model as propositions.
However, wethinkthatframingeffects,i.e.,violationsofextensionalityindecision
contexts,arenormativelygrounded.Themainreasonisthatcontrarytowhatisusually
asserted, it can be justiﬁed to set different utility values on coreportive sentences, to
the extent that these sentences provide different clues as to the likelihood of events
conﬁrming that we have made the right choice, as McKenzie and Nelson (2003)’s
experiments have made clear.
In order, therefore, to allow for framing effects in the Bolker–Jeffrey model, we
introduce some slight modiﬁcation of the structure of the underlying set and of its
interpretation, making room for a precise definition of coreportiveness. This modiﬁ-
cation leads toaformalization ofthe intuitiondiscussedabove, thereforeshowing that
this intuition follows directly from a rigorous analysis of the modiﬁed Bolker–Jeffrey
decision model that we propose.
While the Bolker–Jeffrey model is essentially an instance of the Bayesian deci-
sion theory, there is no reason to believe that the analysis of framing effects done in
this context strongly relies on core Bayesian assumptions. Indeed, we show that, in
a standard Savagean framework, it is possible, at the cost of introducing a family of
conditional preference relations, to extend the results presented here to the case of
ambiguity, where beliefs are represented by a nonadditive probability or capacity.
This research leads to broader questions.
The ﬁrst relates to the nature and status of anomalies in decision theory. It has been
taken for granted in the last two decades that, contrary to, say, violations of expected
utility like the Ellsberg paradox, these anomalies could not be incorporated into a
rational account of decision making, and were evidence to the fact that a normatively
sound and descriptively accurate decision theory was impossible. It seems to us that
the results presented here cast some doubt on this claim, and give some hope that
these anomalies may be treated as rigorously and successfully as the Ellsberg paradox
and ambiguity aversion have been in the last decades. At a deeper level, though, the
question of the proper norm that should be used to classify anomalies seems to us an
open and interesting question.
Second, we would like to deepen our understanding of the way one could elude
extensionality in the Bolker–Jeffrey decision model, doing away with this implicit
axiom altogether. It seems to us that this would entail working with structures more
general than Boolean algebras, which from a technical point of view is far from
trivial. Moreover, in our representation theorem, there is no primitive definition of
informational equivalence: informational equivalence is a revealed notion. It would
be interesting to explore, from a syntactical point of view, this notion in propositional
logic.
Acknowledgments The authors gratefully acknowledge the deep comments of John Broome which
greatly contributed to the improvement of this article. We also thank Ethan Bolker, Giacomo Bonanno,






































9Framing effects as violations of extensionality
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 2
The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1. By Bolker’s theorem, there exists a function U : P → R and a probability
measure P : P →[ 0,1] such that
(a) U(p) ≥ U(p ) ⇔ p  p .
(b) Forall p, p  ∈ P,U(p) = U(p∧p )P(p  | p)+U(p∧¬p )P(¬p  | p),
where
P(p  | p) :=
P(p  ∧ p)
P(p)
.
Step 2. Let ϕ ∈  ,e ∈ E. Deﬁne:
Pϕ(e) := P(ϕ(e)).
Let us show that Pϕ is a ﬁnitely additive probability measure.
First, because ϕ is a morphism, ϕ( ) =  , therefore, Pϕ( ) = P( ) = 1.
Second, for disjoint e and e ,
Pϕ(e ∨ e ) = P(ϕ(e ∨ e )) = P(ϕ(e) ∨ ϕ(e )) = P(ϕ(e)) + P(ϕ(e ))
= Pϕ(e) + Pϕ(e ).
Step 3. For all e ∈ E, k ∈ K (e), ϕ,ϕ  ∈  , we have, using the fact that ϕ and ϕ  are
morphisms:
ϕ(e)  ϕ (e) ⇐⇒ U(ϕ(e)) ≥ U(ϕ (e))
⇐⇒ U(ϕ(e) ∧ ϕ(k))P(ϕ(k) | ϕ(e))+U(ϕ(e) ∧¬ ϕ(k))P(¬ϕ(k)|ϕ(e))
≥ U(ϕ (e) ∧ ϕ (k))P(ϕ (k)|ϕ (e))
+U(ϕ (e) ∧¬ ϕ (k))P(¬ϕ (k)|ϕ (e))
⇔ U(ϕ(e ∧ k))Pϕ(k | e) + U(ϕ(e ∧¬ k))Pϕ(¬k | e)
≥ U(ϕ (e ∧ k))Pϕ (k | e) + U(ϕ (e ∧¬ k))Pϕ (¬k | e)
⇔ Pϕ(k | e) ≥
U(ϕ (e ∧ k)) − U(ϕ (e ∧¬ k))
U(ϕ(e ∧ k)) − U(ϕ(e ∧¬ k))
Pϕ (k | e)
+
U(ϕ (e ∧¬ k)) − U(ϕ(e ∧¬ k))
U(ϕ(e ∧ k)) − U(ϕ(e ∧¬ k))
⇔ Pϕ(k | e) ≥ Pϕ (k | e),
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Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 4 and Corollary 1
Proof (Theorem 4)
Step 1. By axiom BP and Theorem 3, there exist a monotonic and subcontinuous V
and a capacity ρ satisfying conditions 1 and 2. Moreover, the second part of
axiom BP implies that for any f ∈ F and K ∈  ∗, there exists cK
f ∈ X
suchthat f|K ∼K cK
f (GhirardatoandMarinacci2001,Lemma29).Byaxiom





. Then VK represents K and satisﬁes
VK(x) = V(x) for any x ∈ X.
Step 2. Let f ∈ F and K ∈ G( f ). Then there exist x, y ∈ X such that:
(i) f ∼K x,
(ii) f ∼Kc y,
(iii) x   f   y,
Therefore, u(x)>V( f )>u(y) and there exists a unique α(K, f ) ∈ (0,1)
such that V( f ) = α(K, f )u(x) + (1 − α(K, f ))u(y). Deﬁne v(K | f ) :=
α(K, f ). Moreover, u(x) = VK( f|K) and u(y) = VKc( f|Kc) by construction
of VK and VKc.
Step 3. Let us deal now with the second part of the theorem.
First, let α ∈ (0,1).L e t f,g be such that f   g. They exist by axiom BP.
Normalize u so that u(c f ) = 1 and u(cg) = 0. Then u(c f )>α>u(cg).
Since u is continuous and X is connected, there exists z ∈ X such that u(z) =
α. Therefore, by axiom NA, there exists A ∈   such that α = u(z) =
V(c f Acg) = ρ(A).
Conversely, let x, y,z be such that x   z   y. Then, there exists α ∈ (0,1)
be such that u(z) = αu(x) + (1 − α)u(y). Now there exists A ∈   such that
ρ(A) = α, hence u(z) = V(xAy).
Now, let K, K  ∈ G( f ) be such that K ⊆ K . By axiom NA, there exists
A  such that c f ∼ x A y , (x , y ) being the support of K . Then, since  is
biseparable,v(K  | f ) = ρ(A ).Similarly,thereexists Asuchthatc f ∼ xAy,
(x, y) being the support of K and v(K | f ) = ρ(A). Now, by axiom MON,
xA  y  f ∼ x A y , and, since x A y  ∼ f ∼ xAy, this implies that
xA  y  xAy, and therefore ρ(A ) ≥ ρ(A), i.e., v(K | f ) ≤ v(K  | f ).
Conversely, assume that v(K | f ) ≤ v(K  | f ) whenever K, K  ∈ G( f )
and K ⊆ K . Then, let A be such that x Ay   f . Then u(x )ρ(A) + u(y )
(1 − ρ(A)) ≥ V( f ), hence
ρ(A) ≥
V( f ) − u(y )
u(x ) − u(y )
= v(K  | f ) ≥ v(K | f ) =
V( f ) − u(y)
u(x) − u(y)
,
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Proof (Corollary 1)
It follows from Theorem 4 and from the definition of good news for a that for all
a ∈ A , for all K ∈ K (a), for all ϕ,ψ ∈  ,
ϕ(a)  ψ(a)
⇔ (VK(ϕ(a)|K) − VKc(ϕ(a)|Kc))v(K | ϕ(a)) + VKc(ϕ(a)|Kc)
≥ (VK(ψ(a)|K) − VKc(ψ(a)|Kc))v(K | ψ(a)) + VKc(ψ(a)|Kc)
⇔ (VK(ϕ(a)|K) − VKc(ϕ(a)|Kc))v(K | ϕ(a)) + VKc(ϕ(a)|Kc)
≥ (VK(ϕ(a)|K) − VKc(ϕ(a)|Kc))v(K | ψ(a)) + VKc(ϕ(a)|Kc)
⇔ v(K | ϕ(a)) ≥ v(K | ψ(a)).
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